As pointed out earlier (https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Why+we+Dont+Deserve+the+Internet+Memcached+Reflected+DDoS+Attacks/23389/) this memcached reflected DDoS thing is pretty bad. How bad? Well, US-CERT updated its UDP-Based Amplification Attacks advistory (https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A) to add Memcache to the list of potential attack vectors. The really telling bit is the chart that shows the Bandwidth Amplification Factor. Before memcache was added the largest factor was 556.9 from NTP where each byte sent in to a vulnerable server would return about 557 bytes in attack traffic. Memecache is listed as 10,000 to 51,000. That’s remarkably large.